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 This thesis seeks to illuminate the participatory role and contribution processes of 
German-Turkish civil society organizations by bringing together existing secondary literature on 
migrant social organizations' purpose and practices with primary source material about two 
German-Turkish organizations in Berlin: the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 
and the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin. While existing literature addresses immigrants' social 
practices of citizenship via civil society organizations or political opportunity structures that 
allow migrant organizations to access various levels of government, this article contributes by 
concentrating on migrant organizations’ discourse production and political participation and 
examining how they alter public debates and pursue policy changes. This focus deals with an 
important aspect of the ongoing discussion in Germany about the efficacy of participatory 
practices as a means to more empowering forms of integration for migrant groups and their 
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 This thesis, submitted for the fulfillment of the Master of Arts in Political Science at 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, examines the role of German-Turkish civil society 
organizations in the production of discourses of belonging within the German political 
landscape. It analyzes how German-Turkish organizations position themselves with respect to 
national political discourses on issues such as citizenship, German national identity, immigration 
and integration, and following this orientation, how they engage with German political 
institutions to promote their position and pursue policy goals. Aligning with the view that 
migrant organizations possess an integrative function, I argue that a part of this function seeks to 
change unsatisfactory discourses of belonging by structurally involving migrant organizations in 
the formulation of more effective integration policies that facilitate deeper political incorporation 
and more equal participation of migrant communities in society.  
 The subject of migrant civil society organizations in Europe and their political potential 
has garnered significant research attention in recent years, especially as Europe continues to 
struggle with migration realities that include rapidly changing demographics, contested national 
and cultural identities, and the socioeconomic challenges of integrating minority groups with 
migratory backgrounds. Migrant organizations have thus been identified by academics and 
politicians alike as potential mediators between established political institutions and migrant 
groups, channels for increased migrant political participation, and bodies of political 
representation for migrant groups at local, national and European levels. This thesis will discuss 
the debate on the role of migrant organizations; however, it generally works from the 
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aforementioned premise, as I consider migrant organizations, based on the literature, to indeed 
possess significant potential as political actors in countries of settlement. 
 I have chosen to look at the dynamics of German-Turkish migrant-based civil society 
organizations in Berlin. Turkish migrant organizations in Germany are an interesting research 
subject for several reasons, not the least of which for the simple fact that the population of 
residents and citizens with a Turkish background in Germany numbers around 3 million, making 
it the largest immigrant group in Germany according to fairly consistent numbers from both the 
2008 and 2015 micro-censuses (Halm et al. 2012: 38; Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 128).  
 Over the past several decades, scholars have been at work to reevaluate the social 
dynamics and demographics of Germany as a de facto country of immigration in light of the fact 
that nearly 17 million German residents, or approximately 20% of the German population, have 
some kind of migration background (Migrationshintergrund) as of 2015. It is a term that is rather 
specific to the German immigration discourse. A migration background, as defined by the 
German federal office of statistics, describes a person who either does not possess German 
citizenship through birth, or who has at least one parent who does not possess German 
citizenship through birth. “Through birth” here refers to the jus sanguinis approach to 
citizenship, or citizenship passed down by “ethnically German” parents through blood as 
opposed to place of birth. A policy change made in 2000, however, grants children of non-
citizens, who have resided lawfully in Germany for at least 8 years, German citizenship through 
birth (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 128). 
  For their part, German-Turks make up nearly a quarter of this group and are 
overrepresented in urban areas, with about 60% of the Turkish community living in urban 
centers like Berlin, where 6.2% of the population has a Turkish background (Towers et. al 2015: 
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91-93). Additionally, the Turkish community is strongly represented in migrant-identified civil 
society organizations, referred to sometimes as migrant self-organizations or MSOs: of 16,000 
MSOs identified in Germany in 2001 study, around 11,000 involved people predominantly from 
the Turkish community. Another later study identified fewer migrant organizations in general, 
but noted that 28% were established by migrants with Turkish backgrounds (Halm et al. 2012: 
41). This has caused scholars to note German-Turks’ relatively strong tendency to organize 
under civil society organizational structures (Pries 2013: 2). Içduygu writes that Turkish 
immigrants engaged rather quickly in civic and political activities in a variety of forms after 
arriving in destination countries, such as establishing civil society organizations, getting involved 
in political parties, acquiring citizenship and/or actively demonstrating and petitioning (Içduygu 
2009: 135). Still, he suggests that despite the expansive literature about Turkish migration 
patterns and immigrant experiences, “[…] relatively little is known about their civic and political 
participation in the receiving societies in which they live” (Içduygu 2009: 137). Throughout the 
thesis, I discuss how Turkish migrant organizations can be spaces for political participation and 
contribution and argue that the TBB and TGB are examples of this, providing new insights about 
how migrant organizations may be shaping and reshaping political discourses of belonging. 
Migrant groups and their associations are interacting with and influencing Germany’s political 
landscape; Germany’s future will certainly be impacted by its changing demographics, and to get 
a better sense of Germany’s policy direction in years to come, it will be useful to observe the 
ways that different groups are making claims in the political sphere today (Foroutan 2016: 230-
1).  
 My research questions asks: How do German-Turkish civil society organizations position 
themselves with respect to national political discourses on issues such as citizenship, German 
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national identity, immigration and integration, and following this orientation, how do they 
engage with German political institutions to promote their position and pursue policy goals 
pertaining to these issues? There are two major components of the research question: the first is 
to understand where we can locate migrant organizations on a number of issues pertaining to 
belonging and inclusion; the second is to then evaluate how certain positions on these discourses 
might translate into policy demands and outcomes that have transformative potential for the 
dominant discourse itself.  
 To provide answers to this research question, the thesis is structured as follows: first, I 
undertake a survey of the existing literature about migrant social organizations in general, then I 
turn to Turkish migrant social organizations specifically. This survey will lay the foundation for 
understanding what has been written on the subject of Turkish migrant organizations as well as 
what has been argued in terms of their potential for burgeoning participatory practices of 
citizenship. I also clarify my own contribution and how I see it enriching and/or challenging 
certain segments of the existing literature. Following this survey, I provide a theoretical basis for 
the concepts I wish to discuss and define the terms I wish to employ; this section sets out 
frameworks for civil society and political participation, political opportunity structures, and 
perspectives on integration. After establishing the subject field and theoretical boundaries, I will 
present a case study on the TBB and TGB in Berlin, looking specifically at primary sources like 
informational and promotional materials, official websites and social media, press releases, 
reports, media coverage and interview responses to provide insights on the discourse production 
and participatory processes within these organizations. I position this analysis with regard to the 
established conceptual and theoretical framework in order to draw conclusions about my 
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research question and suggest directions for further research. With this roadmap in mind, I will 




























2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 This section first provides a brief history of Turkish migration in Germany followed by 
an overview of the existing literature concerning migrant organizations in Germany generally, 
Turkish migrant organizations in particular and the citizenship and integration debates in which 
research about the activities of migrant organizations has been steeped. I offer an assessment of 
the conditions under which current and ongoing research about migrant organizations is taking 
place and point out key developments. Throughout the survey, I identify gaps or remaining 
questions in the literature and conclusively, I clarify the contribution that this thesis intends to 
make. 
 
2.1 Historical Background 
 The Turkish migration story to Germany is one which has been iterated and reiterated 
many times—still I wish to briefly summarize the general historical background in order to 
provide a sense of the setting in which these organizations developed. Despite a longer history of 
migration between Germany and Turkey pre-dating both world wars, most scholars draw 
attention to the crucial post-war Gastarbeiter or “guest worker” period of the 1960s as a starting 
point for the developments that led to the German-Turkish migration dynamic as it appears 
today. Desperately in need of manual labor in order to rebuild West Germany after the war, the 
government decided to rely on foreign labor to fill the vacancies, thereby signing bilateral 
agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), 
Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) in order to facilitate temporary work 
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contracts. From 1961 until 1973, Germany hosted nearly 2.5 million guest workers, of which 
528,414 were Turks, according to statistics kept by the federal agency of labor (Yurdakul 2009: 
25). By 1973, Turks represented about 10.8% of the German labor force (Akgündüz 2008: 127).   
 The worldwide oil shock of 1973 led the West German government to terminate the 
remaining guest worker contracts, thus officially ending the first wave of Turkish labor 
immigration; however, the second wave began directly afterwards as Turkish laborers settled and 
called their families to join them, which they could legally do under the family reunification law 
enacted by the West German government (Yurdakul 2009: 23). This significantly changed the 
composition of Turkish immigrants arriving in Germany and constituted the first shift away from 
status as “guests workers” toward “immigrants” with plans to settle, regardless of how unwilling 
the West German government was to recognize this reality.  The semantics of the term “guest 
worker” had planted the idea firmly in the minds of the very politicians who facilitated the labor 
agreements that the workers’ stay would be merely temporary. Thus, even in confirming their 
status as immigrants by bringing their families to start new lives in Germany, the former guest 
worker groups were given little opportunity for meaningful incorporation into the structure of 
German society (Mandel 2008: 55). This denial at the highest levels of government is often 
referred to in the literature by referencing former chancellor Helmut Kohl’s insistence in the 
1980s that “Germany is not a land of immigration”, which to some extent was a view still held 
by some high-level officials well into the early 2000s, most notably reiterated by former German 
Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006 (Dernbach 2006). Such statements give an 
impression of the hostile attitudes concerning immigration displayed in recent decades in 
Germany, yet immigration was indeed a reality and immigrant groups slowly began demanding 
recognition of their presence and drawing attention to their needs, thus shifting the political 
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discourse towards topics like integration and citizenship. The remainder of the literature review 
examines the development of these discourses amidst migrant groups’ growing demands for 
inclusion. 
 
2.2 Existing Literature 
 Empirical research on migrant organizations (MOs) in Germany has been a growing field 
since its birth in the 1980s, a time in which Turkish immigrants in German public discourse were 
largely construed as a “problem” (Thränhardt 2000: 15). Due to this political atmosphere, early 
works tended to focus on segregation and the establishment of “parallel societies” as negative 
effects of immigrant organizations (Çetinkaya 2000: 83). This perception slowly changed over 
the decades.  
 One of the most prolific German scholars on the subject, Ludger Pries, has written 
extensively about Turkish and Polish immigrant associations in Germany, but notes that the field 
is still developing. Despite a number of empirical studies conducted on migrant organizations 
since the 1980s and the evolution from negative to more positive interpretations, he maintains 
that “[…] no consensus has been reached on the predominant role and impact of MSOs” (Pries 
2013: 2). While he also maintains that there is no generally accepted definition of migrant 
organizations, he provides one that identifies three predominant characteristics as follows:  
  […] associations (1) whose goals and objectives are derived primarily   
  from the situation and the interests of individuals with a history of    
  migration and (2) whose members are mostly individuals with a migration  
  background and (3) in whose internal structures and processes individuals   
  with a migration background play a significant role. (Pries 2013: 1)  
 
Migrant organizations are extremely heterogenous—from MOs that have a very specific function 
(like a sports club) to MOs that act as umbrella organizations, and from being comprised by one 
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distinct ethnic or religious group to encompassing multiple identity groupings—yet Pries’ three 
aforementioned characteristics direct attention to the shared identity and function of MOs as 
places of collective resources and action specifically shaped by and aimed towards groups whose 
major identity factor is rooted in a migration history or experience.  
 Yurdakul argues that the migration factor remains important to the identity and function 
of MOs, even after first-generation immigration has concluded, because such organizations were 
initially founded as a form of political resistance to societal structures that continually denied 
immigrants’ rights and full political participation long after initial immigration (Yurdakul 2009: 
114). Since these structural barriers continue to exist in the status quo, MOs continually operate 
from a premise of migration experience and concerns, even if many members with migration 
backgrounds have no first-hand migration experience. Thus MOs are inherently geared towards 
addressing challenges specific to particular migrant groups over multiple generations. Odmalm 
has distinguished four major functions of MOs in Europe, namely 1) to act as links between 
home and host societies and offer services, advice and expertise about social and legal issues 
affecting migrants 2) to complement state efforts towards integration and provide information 
and training in the native language 3) to act as political and community representatives of 
particular ethnic and identity groups and 4) to serve as transnational contact points and actors 
(Odmalm 2009: 158; see also Oner 2014: 77). 
 Much of the early literature focuses on types of organizations and the tendencies of 
different national or ethnic groups to organize in various ways. It has also been heavily focused 
on MOs’ historical development in various contexts and their influence on integration processes 
(Özcan 1992; Thränhardt & Hunger 2000). Many early studies take on the task of categorizing 
and describing various MOs in terms of structure, resources, members, and responsibilities (Pries 
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& Sezgin 2012: 5; Kücükhüseyin 2002). Some earlier work identifies different objectives of 
MOs in order of frequency and priority, listing the top ten objectives as follows: (in descending 
order) culture, meeting, religion, sports, counseling, guidance, politics, education, humanitarian 
aid and leisure (Pries 2013: 2). While this is necessary groundwork, it provides little insight into 
the more complex activities MOs are engaged in or the impacts MOs may have on individual 
members as well as other groups, political institutions, public discourses and society at large. 
Thus scholars gradually began asking questions about what exactly it is that MOs do and 
whether these activities have noteworthy effects on societies of immigration.   
 Whereas the early literature focused on the conditions for formation and the kinds of 
tasks such associations were created to fulfill, the more recent literature is concerned with the 
links that MOs have established to formal channels of political participation in the receiving 
countries, the citizenship politics of the receiving country, the political opportunity structures in 
which MOs are embedded and the public discourses surrounding MOs (Faist 2009: 317).  This 
reflects a shift, one which early scholars like Thränhardt called for, towards framing MOs less as 
passive political objects and focusing instead on their activities and claims; in fewer words, their 
potential as political actors (Thränhardt 2000: 46). While Yurdakul interprets the establishment 
of MOs in Germany as a form of political resistance, other scholars link their establishment to 
policy developments in the guest worker years. Halm et al. reference post-War Germany’s 
Anwerbestopp, or contract termination policy of 1973, as a catalyst for immigrant groups to 
organize formally. Lacking the more automatic integrative function of the labor market for newly 
arrived family members, new avenues for community building were urgently needed in guest 
worker neighborhoods (considering that the German state took an essentially non-integration 
approach to complement their non-immigration interpretation of the guest worker problematic). 
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Immigrants therefore took on active roles towards negotiating community issues early on. Halm 
et al. suggest that this explains the “[…] sudden emergence of MOs of a new quality in the 
1970s, quickly replacing the few ‘workers’ organizations’ established in the 1960s that allowed 
for only informal exchange […]” (Halm et al. 2012: 41).  
 The existing literature specifically concerning Turkish MOs in Germany exhibits a 
similar arc, first presenting such organizations as examples of self-segregation, but eventually 
through more historical and descriptive work, has regarded Turkish MOs as potential bridging 
agents between an immigrant community and formal institutions. Çetinkaya elaborated on the 
specific development of Turkish MOs in each decade starting in the 1960s, when organizations 
predominantly took the form of workers’ unions, where Turkish guest workers had spaces to 
exchange information about working conditions and pool their resources towards solving 
collective workers’ problems. These included organizations like the Verein türkischer 
Arbeitnehmer in Köln und Umgebung, or the Organization for Turkish Workers in the Cologne 
Area, and Europäische Föderation Türkischer Sozialisten (Avrupa Türk Toplumcular 
Federasyonu), or the European Federation of Turkish Socialists. Few organizations existed that 
did not have some direct connection to guest worker concerns. The Turkish MOs of the 1960s 
were therefore initially founded to provide stability to guest workers who, living in separate 
quarters without family or contacts, were very disconnected from German society (Çetinkaya 
2000: 85).  
 With 70% of all Turkish guest workers arriving to Germany between 1970 and 1973, and 
the subsequent reunifications of their families in Germany, the 1970s saw the greatest 
demographic change of Turkish immigrants settling in Germany, which naturally manifested in 
MOs as well; they began to multiply and differentiate in order to meet various needs. Many 
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religiously-oriented Turkish MOs were founded at this time and remained closely connected to 
Turkey. Another trend was the increase of political organizations as a response to Turkish 
politics. The 70s were the most crucial foundational phase for religious and political 
organizations as well as for the umbrella organizations bringing these together (Çetinkaya 2000: 
86-7).  
 In the 1980s, Turkish MOs continued to differentiate and address various social needs 
arising from new settlement, adding many sports, work, cultural, social-service oriented, leisure, 
women’s, parents’ and youth organizations. These years also marked a shift towards interest- and 
service-oriented organizations that sought to represent and assist Turkish immigrants in the 
public realm—further evidence of their intention to settle and become a part of German society. 
Some scholars have noted that Turkish MOs flourished in these years to counter the deficits in 
service provisions that would have normally been arranged by charity organizations or the 
German state. Others have found that such interpretations portray immigrants as too passive or 
reactionary, pointing instead to families’ proactive desire to preserve their origin-country culture 
and community links (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012: 69). Çetinkaya also notes a definitive shift 
towards Germany and German politics as the anchor of Turkish MO activities during this period, 
further evidence of Turks’ own recognition of their permanent status as a minority group in 
Germany (Çetinkaya 2000: 87-8).  
 In the 1990s, the founding of new Turkish MOs slowed significantly, corresponding to 
decreasing Turkish migration to Germany; simultaneously, fewer MOs remained oriented 
towards Turkey and concerned themselves more with the interests of Turks in Germany. Further 
differentiation around interests continued, with social and political issues as the bulwark of the 
majority of Turkish MOs (Çetinkaya 2000: 89).  
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 In my survey, I have found that recent literature on Turkish MOs tends to relate to two 
major discursive fields: 1) Integration discourses, which continually look at Turkish MOs in 
terms of integrative potential, largely as a response to earlier literature suggesting that MOs had a 
segregative function and 2) Citizenship discourses, which tend to forego definitive conclusions 
about integration in favor of highlighting political participation and multiple avenues and arenas 
for citizenship practice. Naturally these discursive fields overlap in some of the literature, but I 
find it useful to orient ourselves with these two major approaches in mind. First I will discuss 
integration debates, then look at examples focused more heavily on citizenship debates.  
 
2.2.1 Integration Discourses 
 A large variety of Turkish MOs remain active today and expand their reach while more 
sharply defining their goals. While a significant portion are religious (38%), that leaves nearly 
2/3 of Turkish MOs that are secular in nature, encompassing sport/leisure, 
economic/professional, cultural, political, educational and social purposes (Towers et al. 2015: 
97). Roughly 14% of these MOs are also considered multifunctional (Halm et al. 2012: 42). 
Some scholars have focused on the identity- and community-building potential of civil society 
organizations, noting that they can often help migrant-identified members navigate “ […] 
multiple belongings and symbolic resources (territorial, religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and 
national) in a transnational context” (Can 2013: 87).  
 However, as a complement to understanding the identity-building processes going on 
inside of Turkish MOs, a number of scholars have been interested in the links forged between 
Turkish MOs and institutions in Germany’s political landscape in terms of integration. Kyrieri 
and Brasser focus on the ongoing transformation of Turkish MOs from political objects to 
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political actors, framing MO political participation as the key to improving integration policy in 
Germany. They begin by pointing out the shortcomings of a policy tool created to balance out 
the lack of formal representation for many immigrants in Germany, namely the advisory councils 
for foreigners (Ausländerbeiräte) at local, state and federal levels. There were more than 320 in 
Germany in 2009, yet their role is limited to consultation and turnout for the council elections is 
perpetually below 20% (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012: 68). Therefore the authors see Turkish MOs as 
the missing link in input-feedback policy creation cycles and argue that the failure of the German 
state to engage with such organizations as partners in the past can explain ineffective former 
integration policies “[…] since non-involvement means that regular input and feedback loops do 
not flow” (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012: 65).  
 They note several promising signs of improvement on this front, referring to the German 
Integration Summit that has taken place since 2006 and gives MOs direct access to federal and 
regional decision makers while allowing them to simultaneously exchange with other MOs to 
define desired policy changes. Moreover, they note an increase in MO participation with state-
subsidized projects. From 2008 to 2012, the percentage of projects funded by the Federal Agency 
for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) that were run by MOs increased from 11% to 27% as result 
of eased restrictions and requirements, which aimed towards making state funding more easily 
accessible for small civil society organizations. Direct MO involvement in policy 
implementation thus usually takes the form of state-subsidized “tandem” projects. The projects 
tend to be similar to typical MO projects, but make the German state a direct stakeholder and aim 
to help state and non-state actors better cooperate and manage projects together. However, some 
MOs criticize these “collaborations” because the agenda-setting power to conceptualize and 
define the projects is not distributed equally amongst actors. This brings the authors to draw the 
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conclusion that MOs are perceived more and more as political actors, but not political partners, 
especially when it comes to integration policy conceptualization (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012: 77-9, 
82). Oner has drawn a similar conclusion, commenting that while MOs act increasingly as 
representative bodies, they lack “[…] full bargaining power vis-à-vis the German authorities” 
(Oner 2014: 81).  
 Other scholars like Mueller have also criticized the fact that “integration” is the main 
working goal of the German state when they partner with MOs, yet German policy continues to 
lack the anti-discrimination measures to ensure the conditions of access and equality for 
German-Turks’ integration into various facets of public life. Thus he considers it no surprise that 
many service-based and religious organizations do not emphasize “integration” as a major goal 
when the Turkish community continues to experience discrimination in housing, employment 
and education, and opt instead to offer access to these services directly through the MO as a 
solution. Mueller thus points out that the shortcomings of integration have defined the character 
of many MOs in the North Rhine Westphalia industrial region of Germany as “self-help” 
community organizations (Mueller 2006: 423-4, 437).  
 The origins of the integration/segregation debate specifically related to MOs in Germany 
can be found in two texts from the 1980s. The first, written in 1982 by Georg Elwert, envisioned 
MOs as important resources for integration that could provide guidance and facilitate the 
exchange of vital information about the host society. A direct response came from Hartmut Esser 
in 1986, who claimed that MOs’ effects were actually segregative, leading to the development of 
parallel societies, especially because of the maintenance of the native language (Kyrieri & 
Brasser 2012: 72). In Germany, “integration” has been the magical word, because the French-
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style “assimilationist” approach was perceived as too nationalist, therefore too uncomfortable for 
Germans with memories of the nationalist past.  
 However, integration has not been the magical word for everyone; some groups have 
proved harder to “integrate” than others, and many question if the term integration is just a more 
politically correct term for a desired, de facto assimilation. Thränhardt points out that, in this 
vein, groups considered “culturally” closer to Germans, perhaps sharing the same religion, are 
less often accused of self-segregation than the Turkish community. Factors like class and the size 
and visibility of the immigrant group also seem to determine the ease of “integration” for various 
groups (Thränhardt 2000: 41). Integration has thus become a loaded term in some circles, and 
while in the public discourse it still has a generally positive connotation, scholars have struggled 
with its implications specifically for the Turkish community. Thus while pointing out that since 
the turn of the new century, in both the public discourse and for the German state, MOs have 
been viewed as valuable dialogue partners for the development and implementation of 
integration policies, Pries also argues that MOs should be regarded as multi-functional and the 
goal should not be to define them either as integrative or segregative (Pries 2013: 2). He claims 
that such attempts oversimplify the activities of MOs and restrict their role as either “bridges of 
integration” or “integration traps”, thus overlooking their multidimensionality and potential to 
serve a number of different purposes in the public realm, from raising awareness about certain 
social issues to facilitating a variety of participatory processes at different levels of German 
public life (Pries 2013: 6).  
 Glick Schiller et al. take a complementary position on the issue, pointing out that 
incorporation into German society need not mean cultural assimilation and indeed can take 
multiple pathways. The authors focus on transnational dimensions, whereby they challenge 
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traditional thinking that successful integration means the loosening of ties to ethnic networks or 
transnational spheres. They posit, rather, that successful integration may hinge upon the 
acceptance of such border-crossing formulations (Glick Schiller et al. 2004: 1). Glick Schiller et 
al. envision five pathways to successful incorporation, one of which they label “local public 
foreigners” and is based on the Turkish case in Germany. They specifically use a case study on 
MOs in Bamberg to highlight how Turkish migrant associations have imitated the structure of 
German civil society organizations, for instance by hosting open houses (Tag der offenen Tür) in 
order to remain visible in their migrant character on the one hand, but assert their local, public 
character oriented towards German society on the other. In settings like this they can highlight 
two simultaneous identities at once, being “publicly Turkish” by openly proclaiming the 
Turkish-migrant nature of the organization, yet adhering to German associational structures and 
organizational rituals, thereby challenging the notion that “foreignness” is necessarily 
incompatible with actively participating in German civil society (Glick Schiller et al. 2004: 6). 
The authors are essentially operating within the integration discourse with this concept, yet 
showing how MOs can simultaneously challenge the parameters of integration.  
 
2.2.2 Citizenship Discourses  
Other scholars have chosen to write about MOs in terms of citizenship modes and practices. 
Starting from the premise that citizenship determines the relationship between the state and the 
individual, citizen status defines both the rights accorded and the obligations expected of 
individuals in a given society. Thus full political rights are often derived from formal citizenship 
status (Odmalm 2009: 151). This is especially true in Germany, where third country nationals 
have no right to vote and official policy prevents dual citizenship. Since many German-Turks do 
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not wish to give up their Turkish passports in exchange for exclusive German citizenship, the 
result is being locked out of formal channels of political participation (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012). 
Germany’s citizenship regime has traditionally been based on the jus sanguinis or “ethnic/blood” 
model of citizenship, meaning that proof of ethnic German ancestry was required to attain 
German citizenship, therefore German naturalization, or “becoming” German, was not possible. 
This citizenship regime was finally restructured in 2000 with Germany’s new immigration law, 
which now allows naturalization after a certain period of residence and also allows children born 
in Germany to foreigners to attain citizenship under certain conditions as well. However, 
restrictions on dual citizenship continue to prevent many Turkish citizens from becoming 
naturalized (Halm et al. 2012: 64). This regime stands in contrast to the jus soli 
assimilation/republican model in France and the multicultural “pillarization” model in the 
Netherlands (Odmalm 2009: 151-2).  
 The literature conceptualizing MO activity in terms of citizenship practices is based 
largely on two models of multidimensional citizenship. The first is Koopmans and Statham’s 
(2000) “two-dimensional citizenship” concept, which locates citizenship modes on multiple axes. 
The vertical axis represents the basis of legitimate political community and spans from ethno-
cultural bonds to residential, civic political culture. The horizontal axis represents the basis of 
cultural community and spans from a monoculture to cultural pluralism. A wide range of regimes 
of belonging can be placed along the axes, as Odmalm notes, “ […] from, on the one hand, civic 
republicanism—ethnic assimilation—and, on the other, civic pluralism—ethnic segregation” 
(Odmalm 2009: 152). The model highlights that citizenship is not reducible to the possession of 
a passport per se, but is also conceptualized in terms of belonging to both the political and 
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cultural community of a society, and can take various forms according to that society’s own 
conception of legitimate and acceptable political and cultural practices.  
 Another concept that builds on citizenship as political and cultural practice is Ehrkamp & 
Leitner’s “relational citizenship”. It seeks a definition beyond formal status, instead 
conceptualizing citizenship as: “[…] constituted, practiced, interpreted and contested through the 
state and institutions of civil society and through civic actions, and at multiple geographic scales 
ranging from the local to the supranational” (Ehrkamp & Leitner 2003: 144). These models 
provide a framework for understanding MO activities as central to citizenship practice. First they 
suggest that citizenship does not have to be accorded formally in order to be practiced, and 
second, they emphasize that this practice is located within civil society structures. Thus scholars 
like Odmalm draw the connection between restrictive formal citizenship policies in Germany and 
the pursuit of alternative forms of political participation: “[…] the lack of formal political 
opportunities have led migrants to develop alternative and more civil society-orientated means of 
participation” (Odmalm 2009: 153-4).  
 Ehrkamp & Leitner argue that MOs represent the institutionalized sphere of German-
Turkish life, providing space to challenge dominant conceptions of German national identity, 
combat discrimination, and encourage active participation in German society (Ehrkamp & 
Leitner 2003: 128). It is perhaps worth noting that it has been difficult for people with migration 
backgrounds to break into the German institutionalized sphere via other means; though they 
make up a fifth of the population, such persons constitute just 10% of public service employees, 
2% of journalists, 4% of city council members throughout Germany and 9% of managerial 
personnel at German foundations. Thus the accessibility of German public institutions for 
intercultural groups has been called into question, further implying that MOs may be filling a 
 20 
crucial gap maintained by structural inequalities (Foroutan 2015: 2). Thus Ehrkamp & Leitner 
put aside state-centered approaches to citizenship in order to highlight how MO leaders and 
organizers have taken the construction of citizenship upon themselves, not as passive recipients, 
but as proactive agents who expand and enrich civil society via a multitude of new organizations 
designed to support their members’ well-being in addition to providing a platform to make 
political claims on local, state and national levels (Ehrkamp & Leitner 2003: 131).  
 As noted, literature on Turkish MOs often displays overlaps between integration and 
citizenship debates and indeed, they are inextricable from each other, even when some of the 
literature focuses more heavily on a single discourse. Yurdakul’s excellent and especially 
relevant work on Turkish MOs in Berlin is an example of bridging these discourses. In contrast 
to Ehrkamp & Leitner, she argues that while claims-making does occur via certain platforms for 
non-citizens, the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is still important because it formally 
enshrines who has the recognized right to make legitimate claims against state authorities 
(Yurdakul 2009: 110). In her book, she presents a case study on the political participation of five 
Turkish MOs in Berlin, two of which I also examine in this thesis.  
 On the one hand, she looks at the dynamics of political representation and how MOs 
influence integration debates; on the other hand, she illustrates how immigrant associations at 
times collaborate with and at times challenge the German state to make claims for membership. 
Within MOs she observes that German-Turks develop their own strategies of integration as 
opposed to passively accepting the integration initiatives rolled out by the German state. In this 
way, she emphasizes the perspective from within the MOs and the agency of such organizations 
to “ […] transform the civic traditions of the new country” (Yurdakul 2009: 11). This idea of 
MOs’ transformative potential in terms of changing the narrative about German identity, a 
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process by which MOs highlight migrant concerns and identities as visible and constitutive parts 
of modern German identity, has been expressed by post-migration scholars as a vision for 
changing long-standing institutions to be more inclusive of Germany’s increasingly diverse 
population (Foroutan 2015: 6).  
 Having outlined the pre-existing literature on the topic of MOs, from looking at initial 
descriptive groundwork and historical development, the integrative/segregative debate, to shifts 
toward writing about MOs as political actors with the power to challenge traditional notions of 
integration and legitimate forms of citizenship, I wish to clarify my own intent for contribution. 
In the body of literature focused on MOs as political actors and agents, there is research on the 
types of claims MOs make and the ways that they challenge the state on issues like integration 
initiatives and formal citizenship. Where I see a gap is precisely in understanding where and by 
which means the new discourses about traditional concepts like integration or citizenship are 
being produced. 
  If traditional notions of belonging, institutionalized via integration initiatives or 
citizenship requirements, are indeed being re-conceptualized, more scholarly work should 
identify the location of and processes behind such shifting discourses. Therefore, by utilizing the 
political opportunity lens to identify locations where discourses may be challenged, I concentrate 
on how MOs may be rich sites for the production of new, re-imagined discourses of belonging 
and how they exert their positions and perspectives in order to alter public debates about German 










3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 In addition to elaborating on several important conceptual terms for our subject, this 
section establishes the theoretical framework for understanding the location of MO discourse 
production in terms of political opportunity structures. We defined MOs in the introduction as 
migrant-centered associations, both in terms of their goals, concerns and objectives as well as it 
is reflected in their membership, leadership and structural elements (Pries 2013: 1). In the case of 
Germany, increasingly active MOs are seen as signs of what scholars are calling the post-migrant 
shift in German society. Post-migrant societies display three necessary characteristics: 1) they 
recognize immigration at present or an immigration history as real conditions of the society and 
therefore acknowledge the subsequent social and structural changes that accompany immigration 
2) they recognize the significant, non-reversible impact of immigration on the country, even as 
they discuss, regulate and negotiate the terms 3) the conflict and controversy that accompanies 
the adaptation of structures, institutions, and political cultures to the migration reality plays a 
central role in public discourse. Thus the prefix “post” refers not to the end of migration, but 
rather the processes of social negotiation that take place after migration occurs, including the re-
negotiations of national identity, forms of participation and citizenship (Foroutan 2015: 2). The 
term continues to gain traction in German academic circles as scholars focus on the particular 
dynamics of a country that has only recently begun to come to terms with the consequences of 
immigration on its society. Therefore, discussion about MOs should be considered against this 
backdrop, as Germany is currently undergoing changes it its own self-understanding; this has 
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implications for the way we talk about modern German civil society and the goals of new 
political actors within civil society representing Germany’s changing demographics.  
 The institution of civil society is an important framework for locating MOs embedded in 
the German political landscape. Civil society has been defined as two-dimensional, its first 
dimension relating to the type of social action it fosters and the second referring to the specific 
social sphere where such action occurs. Regarding the first dimension, such social action 
observable within civil society is:  
  […] oriented toward conflict, compromise, and agreement in the public   
  sphere; it stresses individual independence and collective self-   
  organization; it is nonviolent; it recognizes differences and plurality as   
  legitimate; it is related to general issues, frequently oriented toward   
  something like the ‘common good’ […] (Kocka 2012: 17) 
 
The social action that characterizes civil society organizations then, is action aimed at 
challenging certain issues and promoting certain changes in the public sphere. Therefore, in 
observing the social actions of MOs it will be important to continually observe these actions in 
relation to their receipt in the public sphere and analyze how such actions are inserted into the 
public realm. Regarding the second dimension, the social sphere or landscape of civil society 
consists of non-governmental self-organizations that represent an extensive network of different 
associational formations like “[…] clubs, associations, social movements, networks, and 
initiatives” (Kocka 2012: 17). These are clearly distinguishable from government, business and 
the private sector, though they may partner with these actors. Other scholars have made this 
distinction by noting that civil society consists of both formal and informal institutions and 
associations that are related neither to production nor government, and are also not familial 
(Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens & Stephens 1992: 6). Civil society also presupposes a certain 
institutional framework with traits like decentralized economic power and limited government, 
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usually constitutional democracy based on the rule of law (Kocka 2012: 18). Vibrant civil 
society has been linked to the production of social capital, which not only increases trust 
amongst citizens, but also in democratic political institutions and is thus considered by scholars 
as a precondition for well-functioning democracy (Berger, Galonska & Koopmans 2004: 492; 
see also Putnam 1993). Furthermore, civil society helps maintain balances of power in 
democratic societies due to its role as a “ […] counterweight to state power” (Rueschemeyer, 
Huber Stephens & Stephens 1992: 6).  Civil society thus acts as a social realm that stimulates 
and sustains political engagement and participation across various societal groups (Faist 2009: 
318, 320).  
 In Germany, civil society has been entrenched since the late 18th century, a time when 
most organizations had distinctly Catholic or social democratic orientations; however, in modern 
times, and specifically since the 1970s, civil society in Germany has take a more issue-centered 
approach. German civil society organizations are typically independent of the state, although 
many receive their primary funding through the state is some shape or form. Yet the corporatist 
elements of the German system, characterized by a long history of privileged relationships 
between the state and trade unions, churches and certain welfare and business organizations, 
noticeably puts immigrant, minority and Islamic organizations at a disadvantage when it comes 
to participation in policymaking processes (Oner 2014: 75-6).  
 For example, because Islam is not a state-recognized religion in Germany 
(Religionsgemeinschaft), the state does not collect taxes for it and it lacks the privileged access to 
politics and much of the public funding that Christian and Jewish organizations enjoy, a remnant 
of those corporatist political structures. For this reason, Turkish Muslim MOs, whether purely 
religious- or social service-oriented, are unable to secure financial support from the German state 
 25 
(Mueller 2006: 422). Thus, not every organization has the same political clout or enjoys equal 
access within the German civil society landscape, which is another important defining feature.  
 A discussion of German civil society inevitably leads to a discussion of the political 
opportunity structure for our case. It is interesting to reveal the ways that civil society 
organizations (CSOs) are embedded in the political structure and following this, what kinds of 
avenues might be available for them to pursue policy agendas and promote desired change. If 
CSOs are always situated within the public sphere, their most essential relationship being the one 
to the public realm, and their aim is to challenge, change or negotiate conditions of that public 
sphere through social action, we must look at where they are afforded opportunities to do so and 
how this affects their strategies for engagement. Political opportunity structure (POS) theory, 
originally developed by scholars of social movements, pays close attention to the strategy of 
groups when it comes to resource allocation, mobilization and target-group selection. Several of 
the variables identified by Tarrow are relevant for looking at CSOs and their activities, including 
the openness or closure (accessibility or inaccessibility) of the polity, the policymaking capacity 
and process within the government, the presence of potential collaborators, and the stability or 
instability of political alignments. Tarrow also points out that political opportunities often 
present themselves in specific time windows, thus making the actors and objectives vary over 
time in response to both external and internal factors affecting the opportunity structure of the 
moment (Tarrow 1988: 429). Kriesi et al. (1992) add a distinction between formal institutional 
structures and their informal procedures with collective groups they call “challengers”. They also 
draw attention to configurations of power in both the formal and informal structures of the 
political system, which may define to what extent collective action that challenges the state is 
either facilitated or repressed. In this model, the formal and informal structures make up the 
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general setting for negotiations and determine the power configurations. The power 
configuration, in turn, defines the chances of success for social action and the willingness of 
those representing the political system toward implementing certain reforms or changes. With 
this view, the potential for change as a result of social action is determined by the dynamics 
between the powerful actors in the political system and the collective agents for change, 
considering the types of restrictions on both members of the system and challengers to it. This 
model therefore also highlights political context, noting that the:   
  […] country-specific mix determines the set of strategic options available   
  for the mobilisation of the ‘challengers’. It provides the crucial link   
  between the POS and the challengers’ decision to mobilise or not, their   
  choice of the form of mobilisation, the sequence of events to be organised,  
  and the target of their campaign. (Kriesi et al. 1992: 220) 
 
Therefore we can expect, based on this model, that the structure of Germany’s political system 
plays a decisive role in the interactions between the state and CSOs (likewise MOs).  
 There is evidence for shifting POS when it concerns MOs. Several scholars have referred 
to the Integration and Islam Conferences put on annually by the German federal government 
since 2006 as examples of a trend toward establishing more partnerships with MOs and 
enhancing co-development projects. Based on the models, examples like these present new 
political windows of opportunity and can have effects on the POS in the long term, shifting it in 
favor of MOs (Halm et al. 2012: 40). Pries & Sezgin have also noted the relevance of POS for 
studies concerning MOs because it provides a conceptual framework for discussing not only the 
aims and goals of organizations, but how they go about achieving these in the political 
environment (Pries & Sezgin 2012: 15; see also Pries 2013: 5). However, the framework of POS 
also reveals constraints on MOs in particular, harkening back to the issues of residual dominant 
class/religious cleavages from Germany’s corporatist state legacy. Odmalm emphasizes 
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distribution of resources and historical precedents as other important factors to consider when 
examining POS. He further argues that there is a certain type of feedback loop that influences 
political opportunities, and that MOs may also redefine their goals, objectives and strategies as a 
response to the types of political cues they receive through interactions with the state (Odmalm 
2009: 154-7).  
 When it specifically concerns MOs, other scholars include the idea of certain types of 
“migration regimes” as another important aspect of the POS. The migration regime refers to “ 
[…] a country’s system of values, laws, practical policies, and procedures relating to the control 
of migration (emigration and immigration regulations) and the treatment—that is, the inclusion 
or exclusion—of individuals with a migration background” (Pries 2013: 5). Understanding the 
migration regime as part of the POS reveals another dimension of the structure that is especially 
relevant for MOs, namely that different migrant groups may also have different types of access 
to the political system based on their participation rights as enshrined in citizenship policy.  
 For Turkish MOs the issue is particularly crucial because, as representatives of a non-EU 
migrant group, lack of citizenship and participation rights present a further set of constraints for 
operating within the POS (Berger, Galonska & Koopmans 2004: 493). However, one can also 
flip this perspective and argue that it is precisely because of these constraints that Turkish MOs 
have developed such strong a strong civil society presence, essentially as a reaction to a POS that 
disadvantages them as an immigrant group (Oner 2014: 78). Yet while one can interpret the 
development of a strong Turkish civil society sector as a response to initial lack of access to 
POS, trends suggest that these barriers are increasingly being overcome and Turkish MOs are 
refining their strategies as challengers to the status quo system. Those strategies for challenging 







4. CASE STUDY: TURKISH-GERMAN MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS IN BERLIN 
 
4.1 Profiling Two Turkish-German Migrant Organizations 
 The two migrant civil society organizations in Berlin chosen for the case study are the 
Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg or the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and 
the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin or the Turkish Community of Berlin (TGB). Both are 
umbrella organizations (Dachverbände) that count a number of other smaller organizations as 
members and act as a common resource and representative voice for these smaller organizations. 
As of this year, the TBB has 30 member organizations in addition to 75 individual members. In 
comparison, the TGB represents 76 smaller organizations, thus holding status as the largest 
Turkish umbrella organization in Berlin and representing around 100,000 citizens. Both are 
categorized as e.V. (eingetragener Verein) organizations, which are officially registered 
organizations with the German government, and both receive state funds for various projects, 
usually designed to provide or improve access to different social services for German-Turks. 
Thus another commonality between the two organizations is the perception by German state 
authorities of their primary role as social service providers. Notably, the TBB has consistently 
received far more state funds than TGB based on its close relationship and ties to Germany’s 
social democratic party (SPD) (Yurdakul 2009: 82; Oner 2014: 81). While the sources do not 
specify exactly how the level of state funding is determined, state funds can stem from a 
combination of various sources, whether these are administered at the local-level of the Landtag 
government and targeted at Berlin-Brandenburg social services and initiatives, or from project 
funds of state affiliated political and social foundations like the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
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(affiliated with the SPD), or from federal, state-subsidized “tandem” projects overseen and co-
developed by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (Kyrieri & Brasser 2012: 
78).  
  Both the TBB and TGB organize educational and job training initiatives and offer social 
and legal counseling services. Additionally, they hold events like workshops, talks or social 
gatherings and create campaigns. On some political issues, they take similar stances. An example 
of this has been their common critique of Germany’s new citizenship law, and the political 
priority of expanding aspects of this law, like dual citizenship. Both groups found enough 
common ground on this issue to release statements, engage in lobbying and establish a common, 
firm position calling attention to their concerns with the law (Yurdakul 2009: 114).  
 However, the two organizations also diverge politically along certain lines and display a 
different composition of members. One reason that the TGB has many more member 
organizations is due to its religious-conservative orientation, thus being the natural umbrella 
organization for many Turkish-affiliated mosques. The TGB’s membership is comprised mainly 
of mosques and sports clubs, but also includes legal, cultural and parents’ organizations. The 
social-democratic TBB, on the other hand, has fewer member organizations but a greater variety 
of more secular-oriented groups formed around music, culture, education, sports, charity, 
medicine, the environment, politics and women’s and parents’ issues. Yurdakul contrasts the 
political backgrounds of the leadership in each organization, remarking that they represent two 
groups of Turkish founding elites. The TBB founders belong to the group of traditional 
intellectuals and political elites with strong pre-existing ties to German state institutions, 
typically from more privileged class backgrounds, whereas the TGB founders came out of the 
woodwork of Berlin-Kreuzberg’s Turkish immigrant community as more organic intellectuals 
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and respected community leaders, sometimes religious leaders, who had greater appeal to 
ordinary Turkish people and religious Turks. Thus the TBB’s founding displays a more elitist 
top-down approach while the TGB developed in a more grassroots manner (Yurdakul 2009: 71).  
 Moreover, while both groups express their commitment to integration and equal 
participation in German society in their mission statements, they advocate different approaches. 
In its mission statement, the TBB calls for German-Turks to work towards a better future in 
Berlin and in Germany as equal contributors in the society. While the organization advocates for 
a diverse society in which different identities and ways of life are accepted and valued, and while 
it rejects all forms of racism and discrimination, it does not make a particular statement about 
Turkish identity as the basis for realizing this vision, nor does it use the term “integration”. 
Instead, it seems to present a picture of its members as firmly rooted in German society as a 
minority group, and considers itself a voice for many different minority groups, not just the 
Turkish minority. This is not to say that integration plays little or no role in the TBB—rather, it 
seems that integration is perceived as a given for people with a Turkish background in German 
society, thus the greater concerns are about equal opportunity, means of participation and 
improving communal life in both social and political terms.  
 At TGB on the other hand, the discussion about integration is centered on a transnational 
approach that highlights the importance of preserving Turkish national identity. The organization 
cites its commitment to the maintenance of Turkish heritage and roots for German 
residents/citizens with Turkish backgrounds and argues that the continual recognition of these 
transnational ties is essential for integration to succeed. They assert that Turks unquestionably 
belong to German society, however they consider direct exchanges with Turkey to be an 
important aspect of integration activities. They perceive current integration challenges to be 
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remnants of the problematic treatment of past Turkish immigrants and they aim as an 
organization to bridge the gaps left by that troubled migration history, thus helping Turks find 
their place in Berlin. They count “integration of Turkish-descended people into the German 
society” amongst their primary goals, yet defend against an assimilatory interpretation of 
integration.  Therefore, the organizations sketch two distinct visions for effective forms of 
participation and incorporation into German society. 
 
4.2 Method 
 Prior presenting the case study results, I will briefly explain the method for data 
collection and analysis. The research was conducted in Berlin and is based on primary sources 
accessed via the official websites, social media platforms and public informational materials of 
the organizations. The main research focuses on an analysis of press releases and other publicly 
available materials about the organizations’ activities. These materials include newsletters, 
public reports, open letters, event notices, campaign notices, petitions, informational materials 
and videos. The research was contextualized and further informed by an interview with the 
president of the TGB, correspondence with the TBB and attendance at several events organized 
by each group. In order to answer my research question and better understand how German-
Turkish migrant organizations position themselves with respect to discourses of belonging and 
how they promote these positions and pursue their policy goals, I analyze the language used in 
the source material to identify thematic patterns and the development of particular positions 
along with instances where demands and claims are made and the strategies for transforming 
these into policy outcomes.  
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 For each organization, I collected and analyzed all available source materials for the 
years 2016 and 2017 to date. This entailed an analysis of each official website (mission 
statements, project summaries, service offerings), 82 combined press releases, 10 newsletters, 
and 8 additional documents consisting of public reports, campaign materials and public letters. I 
identified important, recurring policy issues and coded the press releases according to the main 
focus of their content across the categories citizenship, German national identity, immigration 
and integration. Some press releases simultaneously addressed multiple categories and some did 
not fall into any of the aforementioned categories. With the analysis and coding of the source 
material, I aimed to get a better impression of the types of policy issues that are most often 
addressed and the particular claims or demands being made in these policy areas. The analysis 
also provided insights into the location of various channels of discourse production about policy 
issues relevant for migrant communities.  
 The research also provides a more complex picture of the role of migrant organizations in 
policymaking processes; the following findings challenge the polarized narrative of MOs as 
bodies that are either integrative or segregative. Rather, it suggests that MOs are displaying 
democratic engagement and increased levels of integration precisely because of the ways they 
challenge pre-existing integration discourses and through the claims they make on the state for 
greater representation and participation opportunities for the migrant community. By rejecting 
certain aspects of German integration politics, Turkish MOs carve out a position for themselves 
as players whose historical experiences give them unique insight as to which integration policies 
succeed and fail. The MOs consistently draw attention to their integration experiences in 
Germany over the past half-century in order to point out where progress has been made and 
where integration policy falls short. In some instances, they turn the tables on policymakers and 
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policymaking bodies by pointing out areas of hypocrisy and instances where the project of 
integration is used as a veil for discrimination, or more often where integration is not seen as a 
two-way street; in order to challenge pre-existing discourses of belonging from new angles, 
Turkish MOs’ demands are heavily anchored in interpretations of German law and democratic 
foundations of the German state, a strategy by which the organizations simultaneously display a 
formidable knowledge of the Federal Republic’s legal, political and philosophical foundations. 
The following sections provide an analysis of Turkish MOs’ contributions to German discourses 
of belonging in addition to an outline of their strategies for achieving desired policy outcomes.  
 
4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 Türkischer Bund Berlin in Brandenburg (TBB) 
 First I will discuss the press releases of the TBB, since these are the organization’s most 
common way to disseminate information on political positions and demands. From a total of 72 
press releases, 58 were dated in 2016 and 14 thus far in 2017. I coded the press releases for their 
content according to four categories: citizenship, German national identity, immigration and 
integration. Of the total, 46 (64%) contained content relevant to the selected categories and 26 
(36%) did not. This shows that a significant portion of the press releases for the time frame are 
concerned with discourses of belonging, and these issues represent the general focus of the 
TBB’s policy agenda. When I coded the press releases into categories, I also gave some entries 
multiple codings; this is inevitable considering the interconnectedness of the issues at hand. 
However, when one focus was strongly present amongst a multi-faceted issue, I chose to assign a 
single coding.  
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 From those press releases deemed relevant, the frequency of the focal issues were, in 
ascending order, citizenship (5 entries), immigration (12 entries), German national identity (16 
entries) and integration (29 entries). Additionally, there were 13 instances of entries receiving 
multiple codings, where two or more categories were heavily addressed. The distribution 
highlights integration policy as a central priority of the organization, with that topic area 
occupying nearly half of all press releases in the time period and nearly two-thirds of the press 
releases with pertinent content. Therefore understanding the nuances of the TBB’s stance on 
integration and the ways in which it challenges current integration policy is central to the 
discourse analysis as well as the TBB’s perception of its own role in the policymaking arena.  
 From 46 relevant press releases, some entries repeated or elaborated on issues that were 
published once before. Therefore, I selected 35 press releases for summary and analysis. The 
vast majority of the press releases focused on challenges to integration policy or contributed to 
public debates about the necessities of integration in addition to demands for increased anti-
discrimination measures at the regional level in Berlin-Brandenburg. Other recurring topics were 
debates about dual citizenship and state loyalty, increased representation in public life as a form 
of more effective integration, and policy concerning the humanitarian treatment and effective 
integration of refugees. The stark evidence for the TBB’s active engagement with integration 
policy issues contradicts the argument that MOs have a primarily segregative function. While the 
TBB often challenges flaws in integration policy, this in no way points to a desire for 
segregation; if anything, the TBB’s criticism and demands for re-shaping integration policy are 
evidence of the valuable stake that MOs have in fostering more effective modes of integration.  
 Criticism often exists simultaneously alongside praise and cooperation. For example, the 
TBB recently made positive comments about new funds made available for economic integration 
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measures, which would do more to recognize qualifications obtained outside of Germany and 
provide additional job training to integrate migrants into the labor market. While praising the 
initiative, the TBB also points out the unequal criteria for the acceptance of credentials between 
EU and non-EU states and criticizes the more intense scrutiny of credentials obtained outside of 
the EU. On the basis of transparency and non-discrimination, the TBB calls for the equalization 
of standards to be met by both EU and non-EU citizens for the recognition of their former 
qualifications (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016a).   
 In another instance, the TBB expressed its approval of a master plan for integration and 
security drafted by the Berlin Senate in March of last year. Amongst the positively received 
proposals were new integration concepts that aimed to make health care and higher educational 
opportunities more accessible to migrant communities, increasing initiatives targeted toward 
women, youth and families, and greater measures to facilitate smooth transitions for participants 
in integration courses into the labor market (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016b). 
However, a week later, the TBB published another press release heavily criticizing the federal 
Minister of the Interior for his proposals concerning refugee integration, characterizing these as 
the antithesis of German “welcome culture” (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016c). 
These two contrasting entries demonstrate praise and criticism aimed at the regional and federal 
levels respectively concerning two different target groups of integration. Interestingly, the TBB’s 
criticisms of German refugee policy conform to a common pattern in the source material, in 
which the TBB justifies its counsel to political institutions by referencing the integration 
experience of its own Turkish migration communities and suggesting that, based on that past and 
ongoing experience, organizations like the TBB can offer better proposals to find effective 
solutions for Germany’s current integration dilemmas.  
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 This thematic thread was picked up again after the parliamentary committee of the 
interior released an outline of policy proposals that would become the new integration law, 
which was enacted in May of 2016. The TBB refrained from sharp critique, but emphasized the 
lack of meaningful reforms or innovative approaches in the proposal, labeling the 
recommendations as a re-packaged, better-sounding version of the same ineffective integration 
policies already in place. The TBB lamented another “missed chance” for the German 
government to create more modern and inclusive integration legislation at this juncture 
(Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016d).  
 It is clear from the wide range of the TBB’s responses to integration issues in Germany 
that the political discourse reflects the extremes of the current public debate. The TBB responded 
to the securitization of integration politics, often slanted against Muslim practices, evidenced by 
repeated calls for burka bans and bans on the use of Arabic language in religious ceremonies or 
the mandatory serving of pork in public daycares and schools; however, in the same short time 
window, the TBB has praised progressive stances espoused by German political foundations like 
the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation based on reports it released on Germany’s future as a 
multicultural society of immigration (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016e; f; g; 
2017a).  
 While many press releases are public reactions to policy events, the TBB also uses these 
entries to make concrete demands on policymakers, especially to their own regional government 
where they have more direct links and mechanisms of accountability. The TBB provided its 
members with access to an overview of its demands for the regional Berlin government prior to 
the September 2016 elections.1 Its integration demands emphasized the creation of an 
                                                
1 See Appendix: Figure 1 
2 See Appendix: Figure 2 
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independent senate committee for integration, refugee and anti-discrimination as opposed to the 
current structure, in which the committee of the interior handles these issues. Moreover, it 
demands more representation of minority groups in public service positions along with the 
recognition of some Islamic holidays by public institutions.  
 The motif of representation as the best form of integration is repeatedly emphasized in 
separate entries, whether as an appeal for greater numbers and visibility of party candidates with 
migration backgrounds, demands for quotas and anonymous application procedures to boost new 
hires with migration backgrounds in public administrative branches, or as celebrations of a 
growing number of applicants with migration backgrounds for Berlin’s police force (Türkischer 
Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016h; i; j; 2017b). Therefore, representation is viewed as a 
missing component of current integration legislation. Finally, it calls for more direct democracy 
and participation rights via communal voting rights for non-German citizens, seeing as many 
German-Turks hold Turkish citizenship and are thus prevented from voting in local elections or 
public referenda. The TBB published these positions in addition to each party’s responses to the 
demands, thereby demonstrating to its members its active engagement in maintaining input-
feedback policy cycles with the regional government.  
 The second major issue addressed by the TBB is the continuous struggle of migrant 
communities in the face of discrimination and the lack of strong anti-discrimination measures to 
legally combat discriminatory practices. This issue is at the crossroads of integration and German 
national identity. On the one hand, the TBB is pro-integration as evidenced by its active 
involvement with integration policy formulation and its desire to see the migrant community 
have equal opportunities and thrive in German society. On the other hand, by bringing attention 
to discrimination in Germany, it makes clear that integration in Germany cannot be successful if 
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it is not a two-way street, and that includes restructuring institutions in such a way that migrants 
have equal opportunities to become integrated.  
 Viewing integration as a two-way street is a paradigm that also challenges conventional 
notions of German national identity, demanding concessions also from the dominant groups in 
German society to ensure the successful incorporation of the minority groups, which in this case 
means enacting further legislation to protect minorities and guarantee their equal rights. The 
TBB have repeatedly called for more anti-discrimination measures and resources in public 
schools and have requested the establishment of an independent judiciary solely responsible for 
dealing with discrimination cases (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016k). A case that 
exemplifies the link between anti-discrimination measures and the view of integration as 
compromise with minorities was brought forth by a female, Muslim schoolteacher in Berlin who 
fought for her right to wear a headscarf in the classroom. One of the TBB’s sub-projects, the 
Anti-Discrimination Network of Berlin (ADNB), assisted her in preparing her case. The issue of 
the headscarf in schools has come into direct conflict with regional neutrality laws in Germany 
that require public servants to refrain from displaying religious symbols in the workplace. 
Moreover, head and face coverings worn by Muslim women in Europe have become a generally 
contentious symbol of the debate about Islam’s compatibility with Western values. Therefore, 
the fight to rightfully wear a headscarf in German public schools symbolizes to a large degree the 
paradigm of integration as a two-way compromise. The TBB reported continually on the 
progress of the case, in which the teacher eventually won a settlement. Following the court 
victory, the ADNB stated its next policy goals to either significantly reform or repeal the 
neutrality laws in Berlin, arguing that these have disproportionately negative effects on Muslim 
women in the workforce (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2017c; d).  
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 The urgency of addressing discrimination issues is expressed by both references to hate 
crimes of the past, such as the infamous murder of a Turkish family in Solingen 23 years ago, 
and continued instances of discrimination in the present, as documented by an ADNB annual 
report and anecdotal reports, one of which told of a German-Turkish family being denied an 
urban garden plot on the grounds that the “migrant quota” for the garden community had already 
been reached (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016l; m; n). The TBB makes appeals to 
policymakers and tracks their continued commitment to anti-discrimination, in many cases 
criticizing the conservative Christian Democrats and its sister party in Bavaria for what they 
observe as exacerbations of discriminatory speech and policy views, whilst they applaud the 
socially progressive parties, the Greens in particular, and Berlin’s red-red-green left-wing 
coalition of the Social Democrats, the Left (Linke) and the Greens (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-
Brandenburg 2016f; o; p).  
 The TBB appeals to policymakers more frequently on the regional level, but also 
occasionally directs its strategy toward the federal, European and even international level. It 
proposed improvements for current EU anti-discrimination laws and published an open letter to 
Chancellor Angela Merkel concerning federal policymakers’ efforts to follow up on a UN 
Committee’s recommendations made to Germany to enact anti-discrimination and anti-racial-
profiling measures (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016q; r). The TBB’s efforts on this 
issue serve a dual purpose, to first raise awareness about the continued discrimination that 
migrant communities face in Germany and demonstrate the necessity of organizations like their 
own, and second, to lobby for policy outcomes on multiple levels of government that incorporate 
anti-discrimination as part of a paradigm of compromise, understood by the TBB as the basis for 
more successfully integrated societies.  
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 The final recurring theme of the TBB’s press releases concerns the citizenship status of 
the community they represent and what the organization sees as double standards about 
citizenship and loyalty of German-Turkish citizens. This issue is discussed in light of two 
debates, one about the rights of German-Turks to remain involved in Turkish politics while 
residing in Germany and one about dual citizenship. First it should be noted that the TBB’s 
demands to policymakers continually address naturalization restrictions for the migrant 
community. Last year it called for reforms to German naturalization procedures, with the goals 
of 1) obtaining allowance to hold multiple citizenships 2) removing the so-called “option model” 
by which young people born with multiple citizenships must choose one at age eighteen 3) 
removing the requirement for family members residing abroad to pass German language and 
cultural studies tests in order to obtain family reunification visas, and 4) simplifying the 
naturalization process, including the reduction of fees.  
 Naturalization restrictions remain one of the biggest items on the TBB’s policy agenda 
because of the strong perception amongst their community members that German-Turkish 
citizens are disproportionately disadvantaged by the current policy, whilst the German 
government tolerates other multiple citizenship holders, like EU citizens or those from privileged 
partner countries like the United States. In an entry from August of last year, the TBB responded 
to comments made by Angela Merkel about her concerns that German-Turks held pro-Erdoğan 
demonstrations in Cologne. The TBB cited two quotes from former German presidents in reply, 
both of which suggest that citizenship should not be conflated with loyalty and that transnational 
ties are an increasingly common reality in Germany. They suggest that Germany should 
celebrate its strong connections to other countries and view its transnational citizens as groups 
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who “belong to [Germany]”, thereby enriching society rather than threatening it (Türkischer 
Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg 2016s).  
 These statements touch on both discourses of German national identity and citizenship. 
The TBB advocates a broader perspective on what it means to be “German”, which could also 
mean having ties to other countries based on Germany’s history. It rejects the idea that German-
Turks should be viewed as less loyal on the basis of their interest or involvement in Turkish 
politics. Simultaneously, the TBB calls attention to the problem with citizenship policy, which 
prevents many German-Turks from accessing full German citizenship in the first place, since 
they do not wish to give up their Turkish citizenship in exchange. This places the Turkish 
migrant community in a double bind; on the one hand, citizenship policy presents greater 
obstacles for Turks to obtain German citizenship than other nationalities, yet on the other hand, 
German-Turks are criticized for maintaining connections to Turkey.  
 In the face of criticisms about the demonstrations, particularly from Christian Democratic 
politicians, the TBB emphasizes that German-Turks represent a broad political spectrum and, 
while not all German-Turks condone Erdoğan’s politics, German-Turks of all political 
persuasions naturally have the right to peacefully assemble and demonstrate according to 
German democratic principles. Responding to the comments of several Christian Democratic 
politicians, who suggested that German-Turks should not exercise their right to demonstrate or 
should even leave Germany if they support Erdoğan, the TBB accuses them of promoting 
mistrust and resentment and threatening the peaceful coexistence of their communities with 
unnecessary and unfounded allegations about their loyalty to Germany (Türkischer Bund in 
Berlin-Brandenburg 2016t; u). The TBB therefore draws the link between citizenship policy and 
public debates about belonging, identity and citizenship practices, even ones of a transnational 
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character. It challenges the monolithic character of German citizenship policy and suggests that 
the reality of many German-Turks is to be involved with both German and Turkish politics as a 
way of being active citizens. Thus, the TBB continues to push for policy outcomes that will more 
closely align citizenship policy and citizenship practices for the migrant community.  
 While the press releases often link readers directly to relevant reports, public letters and 
further reading material, the newsletters and social media pages of the TBB serve a different 
purpose, mainly to encourage greater political engagement and participation amongst members 
while providing an image of the TBB to the public. The TBB led a large-scale “postcard 
campaign” prior to the Berlin regional elections, encouraging German-Turkish voters to make 
their voices heard. The postcards contained Turkish-language messages combined with Turkish 
cartoon imagery to encourage German-Turks to go to the polls.2 The TBB’s social media also 
advertised the campaign and organized an election picnic on the day of the elections to 
encourage higher turnouts.  
 The newsletters of the TBB often provide notifications for such events and keep members 
and interested parties informed about the projects and activities of the TBB. The newsletter also 
disseminates information about current campaigns, demonstrations and petitions that are related 
to migrant community issues and easily links members to resources where they can support such 
efforts. The press releases are always prominently featured in the newsletters as a way to report 
on progress made in the TBB’s policy agenda. Additionally, the TBB uses social media to show 
alliances with other organizations and politicians by posting photos of gatherings, meetings and 
other cooperative engagements. These additional outlets serve the main purpose to mobilize the 
TBB’s own community and involve them in the political conversations that shape the TBB’s 
                                                
2 See Appendix: Figure 2 
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policy agenda, creating a feedback-loop between the formulation of political demands by the 
organization and political engagement by its community members and supporters.  
 
4.3.2 Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)  
 The TGB focuses on a narrower set of issues in its press releases and policy demands; 
this is partly due to the fact that the TGB also concentrates on Turkish-Muslim political issues as 
opposed to the more broad, secular-oriented TBB. Thus, many of their political concerns address 
Islamophobia and the struggles of Muslim religious minority groups in Germany. The TGB also 
does not rely as heavily on press releases to disseminate information to the public, though the 
press releases available do provide strong evidence of the TGB’s positions and policy demands. 
For the same time window, the TGB published only 10 press releases, of which 5 contained 
relevant content pertaining to discourses of belonging. All of the relevant press releases focused 
on integration, and each one also takes the paradigm of integration as compromise, whether this 
comes in the form of calls to denounce German right-wing politics as anathema to integration 
and German democratic values, or demands for anti-discrimination legislation and greater 
involvement of MOs in policy formulation. Three entries emphasized the importance of political 
participation through demonstrations and voting and demanded more local voting rights for non-
citizens, demonstrating the strong support for citizenship practice and participation, regardless of 
citizenship status. Finally, the TGB also strongly emphasizes representation as the best form of 
integration, calling for Muslim representation in a number of public administrative branches and 
notably also on public radio stations.  
 The TGB takes a strong oppositional stance to the rise of the right-wing AfD (Alternative 
for Germany) party on the regional and federal levels. While they share this oppositional stance 
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with the TBB, the TBB tend to criticize center-right parties more for appeasing AfD supporters 
while the TGB views the AfD and its anti-Muslim stances as a direct threat to both the Muslim 
community and German democratic values. The TGB invokes German values of tolerance, 
mutual respect and religious freedom to condemn the AfD’s stances and suggests that the party is 
creating a conflict where there has predominantly been peaceful coexistence for over 50 years. 
By presenting the AfD as anti-democratic, the TGB positions itself in contrast as a democratic 
actor fully aware of Germany’s democratic norms and freedoms. This serves once again to 
challenge conventional discourses about integration and German national identity; furthermore, 
this stance attempts to turn nativist, anti-Muslim sentiment on its head as evidence of poor 
integration and a deficient understanding of German culture and values on the part of right-wing 
supporters. Invoking German democratic values thus allows the TGB to present itself as an actor 
that is well-integrated enough to understand the foundation of liberal, democratic German 
society and also to recognize threats toward German values (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. 
2016-2017a; c; d).  
 Yet the TGB also criticizes current integration policy and aligns with the TBB in its 
demands for more anti-discrimination legislation and reforms to the neutrality laws that 
disproportionately affect Muslim women (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. 2016-2017b). The 
current President of the TGB, Bekir Yilmaz, expressed that German-Turks have largely done 
their part to integrate into Germany; they are undoubtedly an important part of the fabric of 
German society. They own businesses and homes, are active in local politics and their children’s 
schools, and get involved with civil society organizations like TGB. Yet discrimination and 
policies that target Muslim communities continue to negatively affect German-Turks’ ability to 
integrate fully and equally into social and economic arenas, and these barriers to integration must 
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be re-evaluated by German policymakers and institutions and reviewed for their own implicit 
bias. Structural barriers, like the neutrality laws, must be modified or removed to create equal 
grounds for Muslims in German society. For this reason, while the TGB sees the importance of 
continued integration work, they also challenge the current integration concept so that 
policymakers are pushed to re-evaluate whether current policies make full incorporation possible 
for the groups from which it demands better integration.  
 For these reasons, in its set of policy demands for Berlin’s ruling parties, the TGB 
proposes the creation of more institutional structures for a variety of MOs to be involved in 
integration policy formulation. The combination of MOs’ links to migrant communities, 
migration and integration experience and organizational competencies uniquely position those 
organizations to offer integration assistance and formulate integration initiatives and goals. The 
TGB frames this not only as a resource they can offer society, but also as an act of deeper 
incorporation for the MOs themselves. Therefore, they call for an expansion of sustainable 
structures and resources for integration work by MOs, more community engagement with and 
through MOs, and more initiation by existing integration-focused state institutions for 
cooperation with MOs. The TGB expresses a vision of more collaborative, two-way integration 
process by arguing that such measures would also give majority-groups in society more access to 
intercultural engagements.    
 The involvement of MOs in integration policy formulation is also part of a narrative of 
political participation and incorporation that the TGB promotes and prefers over traditional 
notions of integration. In addition to this proposal, they encourage members to participate in 
demonstrations and vote, both in their press releases and through their social media sites. Several 
dual-language campaign posters encourage voting, one reading “You decide! Your voice for 
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your future” for Berlin’s regional elections. Another makes a reference to the danger of AfD, 
noting its strong results in another German state and warning that “Voting is like brushing your 
teeth, if you don’t do it, they’ll turn brown!” (Brown is a reference to the color of the NSDAP) 
(Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. 2016-2017a).3 An important item on TGB’s policy agenda 
is securing communal voting rights for non-citizens. This is also evidence of the TGB’s 
encouragement of a practiced citizenship; maintaining transnational ties to Turkey is important 
for the TGB, but their claims for communal voting rights also demonstrate that Turkish 
citizenship should not prevent migrant communities from being active, engaged citizens in local 
German politics.  
 Finally, the TGB adheres to the idea that representation is the best form of integration by 
demanding more Muslim representation in public service positions, specifically in the advisory 
council of Berlin’s public radio and to sit on Berlin’s commission for hardship cases. They argue 
that Muslim representation in Berlin’s public radio is an important step towards equal 
representation and will help avoid misrepresentations of Islam and Muslims, therefore changing 
or avoiding the production of negative, Islamophobic discourses on public informational 
channels. Likewise, representation on the hardship case commission would be important because 
many applicants to the commission come from the Muslim community and a representative 
would have more contextual knowledge and social and religious competency concerning the 
issues that Muslims might bring before the commission. Several of the TGB’s projects also 
cooperate with other public service branches, like the police and fire department, in order to 
create initiatives to boost the number of applicants from young people with migration 
backgrounds. Another initiative, to make Turkish language available as an elective in Berlin’s 
                                                
3 See Appendix: Figures 3 & 4 
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public schools, is linked to a petition on the TGB’s website (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. 
2016-2017e). Greater incorporation of the German-Turkish Muslim community in many 
different realms of social, political and economic life is the thread that ties together the TGB’s 




























 My case study shows that the two organizations selected share many common political 
positions and goals pertaining to citizenship, German national identity, immigration and 
integration. The issues particularly revolve around problematic integration politics; both groups 
challenge conventional, one-sided integration discourses and demand changes to current 
integration policies with the goal of facilitating better incorporation and political participation 
opportunities by removing barriers of a discriminatory nature. Thus public debates about these 
various “discourses of belonging” inevitably return to ill-fitting approaches toward integration as 
the root problem. My research shows Turkish MOs in Berlin making significant claims to 
owning and finding solutions to such problems in the policy realm. Not only do they see 
themselves as political actors in the discussion about integration policy’s failings, they see 
themselves as policy partners whose unique and long-standing experience with German 
integration policy puts them in a position to propose reforms toward more effective integration 
politics. They display extensive engagement in policy feedback cycles, through which they make 
demands on their policymakers, track their commitment to policy changes, and in the meantime, 
constantly offer criticisms of undesirable policies alongside proposals for better solutions.  
 Both organizations are keenly aware of their rights as accorded by the German 
constitution. My research suggests that they also use their understanding of German political 
foundations and values to demand more opportunities for participation and representation of 
migrant communities, even for non-citizens. Initiatives to demand more participatory rights to 
non-citizens demonstrate a belief in practiced citizenship; at the same time, the TBB especially 
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advocates more pathways to official citizenship. The focus of both MOs on increased 
opportunity for participation regardless of citizenship status and greater representation displays, 
in fact, a deeply integrative character of Turkish MOs in Berlin, serving as a rebuke to the idea 
that such groups seek to seal themselves off from society. Rather, the evidence supports my 
argument that MOs are not only integrative, but also seek to change unsatisfactory discourses of 
belonging by structurally involving MOs in the formulation of more effective integration policies 
that facilitate deeper political incorporation and more equal participation of migrant groups in 
German society.  
 Thus when it comes to discourses of belonging and policy reflections of these discourses, 
Turkish MOs seek to play a transformative role. They seek to transform and open up notions of 
German national identity when they claim that German-Turks can be both transnational as well 
as loyal and active citizens of the German state. They seek to transform the idea of citizenship as 
something that can be practiced, even when it is officially withheld, by encouraging migrant 
communities to vote, demonstrate, sign petitions and make demands on their policymakers. Their 
demands for communal voting rights enshrine this idea of a practiced, active citizenship so that 
even non-citizens can become more incorporated into their local polities. Most importantly, they 
seek to transform the integration discourse by reconceiving it as policy hinged upon compromise 
that comes in the form of greater recognition, representation and extra protections for minority 
groups from discrimination in German society. Turkish MOs display their willingness to engage 
as active civil society institutions whilst they make continued demands on the German state to 
meet them halfway with the reform of integration policy measures.  
 My contribution to the literature further discredits the argument that MOs are segregative 
and extends the direction taken by Yurdakul when she looked at the political strategies of 
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Turkish MOs. My research builds on the foundation of her premise that as political actors, 
Turkish MOs develop their own integration strategies and forms of political participation. My 
contribution suggests that, armed with their own integration and participation strategies, Turkish 
MOs in Berlin are demanding a seat at the table with policymakers in new integration policy 
formulation, especially as this policy is being re-evaluated in light of the refugee crisis. Yurdakul 
suggested the transformative potential of MOs, which reflects both the policy demands made by 
both the TBB and TGB and in some cases, policy outcomes. My analysis of the MOs’ positions, 
claims, demands, and initiatives showed a recurring pattern that challenges conventional notions 
of German national identity, citizenship and integration and calls for their transformation, even if 
only in incremental policy steps.  
 Further research must more closely examine the incremental policy changes that take 
place in the continued rotations of input-feedback policy cycles between German policymakers 
and MOs. It must also seek to obtain a more detailed analysis of the relationships between MO 
umbrella organizations and the migrant community members and member organizations that 
they represent. Furthermore, it must ascertain whether channels of participation provided by civil 
society organizations can necessarily provide the full range of resources for full incorporation 
into society for non-citizens and whether practiced, relational citizenship can be a feasible 
alternative to formal citizenship in this respect.  
 By looking closely at the activities and goals of migrant organizations in Germany, it 
becomes obvious that MOs are playing a continually important role in not only facilitating 
different forms of participation for migrant communities, but also in re-shaping the debates and 
discussions about migrant participation and incorporation on the German political landscape. 
Migrant organizations, indeed as seen through the example of Turkish MOs, have become a 
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crucial part of the fabric of German civil society in a country with rapidly changing 
demographics, which will continue to transform the civic traditions and self-conceptions of the 






























































Figure 4: TGB Campaign Post: “Please go vote! Voting is like brushing your teeth, if you 
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